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32![Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria∗ Ho-Lin Chen† Tim Roughgarden‡ Gregory Valiant§ Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria∗ Ho-Lin Chen† Tim Roughgarden‡ Gregory Valiant§](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/5565202aaca361b6f4df2d426a2f1aa5.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2009-05-25 23:29:17
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33![MBS TECHNICAL REPORT MBSDecomposing Models of Bounded Rationality Daniel Jessie∗and Ryan Kendall† MBS TECHNICAL REPORT MBSDecomposing Models of Bounded Rationality Daniel Jessie∗and Ryan Kendall†](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/32893a799dd84051e221f1bb9848dff8.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.imbs.uci.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2015-07-10 18:20:22
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34![The Price of Optimum in Stackelberg Games on Arbitrary Single Commodity Networks and Latency Functions A.C. Kaporis∗ Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras University Campus, Building The Price of Optimum in Stackelberg Games on Arbitrary Single Commodity Networks and Latency Functions A.C. Kaporis∗ Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras University Campus, Building](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/6cb8dc7d0fce1e16c2d34b4a66c35e37.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: students.ceid.upatras.grLanguage: English - Date: 2008-12-11 12:57:59
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35![Mechanism Design by Creditability? Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory ETH Zurich, Switzerland Abstract. This paper attends to the pro Mechanism Design by Creditability? Raphael Eidenbenz, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, and Roger Wattenhofer Computer Engineering and Networks Laboratory ETH Zurich, Switzerland Abstract. This paper attends to the pro](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/a26b49766f16c4da398bac672fd1ab14.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.tik.ee.ethz.chLanguage: English - Date: 2015-05-18 12:16:19
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37![Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/3c4a6e90bb02fc36cda9aee66f51c39d.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.cadmo.ethz.chLanguage: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
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38![Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001. Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information* Frank Heinemanna, Rosemarie Nagelb and Peter Ockenfelsc First version 7. August 2001.](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/2e99c8826fbdd668fd5b0dc0b18e8235.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2011-04-12 09:46:06
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39![Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty∗ P. Battigalli S. Cerreia-Vioglio F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci† July 18, 2013 ∗ Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty∗ P. Battigalli S. Cerreia-Vioglio F. Maccheroni M. Marinacci† July 18, 2013 ∗](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/5d54ced86345e5cfd54f7384828a72ba.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.istfin.eco.usi.chLanguage: English - Date: 2014-03-06 03:29:56
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40![CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ • CHARACTERISING EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES CHRISTIAN BASTECK*,◦ ◦ ¨ •](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/82632bbac71eba2c2083ad0eecbad7c0.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.deLanguage: English - Date: 2013-10-21 03:26:58
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